kind of inverted pragmatic demonstration of the practical importance and validity of knowledge and understanding of mental phenomena.

If the mechanical biology stands helpless before the facts of organic evolution, achieving an ever more detailed description of its course, but unable to evolve a tenable theory of the process, and, especially, finding itself without the slightest ray of light to throw upon the leading feature, the most wonderful aspect, of that evolution—namely, the evolution of the powers of intellect and purposive action—equally and even more obviously is it unable to formulate a tenable theory of the course of individual development; although it continues to elaborate a more and more detailed description of the various steps of such development.

Embryology and Genetics

I said just now that this inability of the mechanical biology to explain the development of the individual organism is obvious. This statement requires some qualification or explication in view of the fact that its truth is not obvious to a large proportion of contemporary biologists, and was not obvious to a still larger proportion of the biologists of yesterday. The qualifying ckuse must be: Obvious to all whose judgement is not obscured by a bias in favour of the mechanical theory.

Two branches of biology are here concerned—namely, embryology and genetics. Both are very modern sciences ; both have made great advances in the description of the phenomena with which they are concerned.

Embryology can now describe in considerable detail many successive stages or states through which some of the higher organisms pass in developing from the unicellular egg into the